Brokerage industry self-regulation: The case of analysts’ background disclosures by BROWN, Lawrence et al.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Accountancy School of Accountancy
11-2009





Singapore Management University, hailu@smu.edu.sg
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1911-3846.2010.01035.x
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Industrial Organization Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Accountancy at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Accountancy by an authorized administrator of Institutional
Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
BROWN, Lawrence; HUGON, Artur; and LU, Hai. Brokerage industry self-regulation: The case of analysts’ background disclosures.
(2009). Contemporary Accounting Research. 27, (4), 1025-1062. Research Collection School Of Accountancy.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1577
Brokerage Industry Self-Regulation: The Case of
Analysts’ Background Disclosures*
LAWRENCE D. BROWN, Georgia State University
ARTUR HUGON, Arizona State University
HAI LU, University of Toronto
1. Introduction
In the aftermath of recent Wall Street scandals, the efﬁcacy of a self-regula-
tory model in the brokerage industry has been called into question (Boni
and Womack 2002). This questioning is not surprising, considering the
conﬂicts of interest faced by the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD) in its dual roles as primary industry regulator and promoter of its
constituents’ interests.1 Our study contributes to recent literature investi-
gating the relevance of brokerage industry regulation by focusing on a dis-
closure initiative which informs investors of investment professionals’
backgrounds.2
We focus on the following question: Can ex ante uninformed investors
seeking earnings research gain knowledge pertaining to two important ana-
lyst forecasting characteristics — forecast accuracy and market credibility
— by using analysts’ background disclosures? We focus on earnings fore-
casts because of their importance to capital markets in forming earnings
expectations (Fried and Givoly 1982; O’Brien 1988) and their value as
* Accepted by Patricia O’Brien. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2007
Contemporary Accounting Research Conference, generously supported by the Canadian
Institute of Chartered Accountants. We thank Patricia O’Brien (associate editor), two
anonymous referees, Mike Mikhail (conference discussant), as well as Fran Ayres, Anne
Beatty, Cristi Gleason, Ole-Kristian Hope, Stan Markov, Emad Mohammad, Bill Rich-
ardson, Phil Shane, Beverly Walther, Jennifer Winchel, and participants at 2007 AAA
Financial Accounting Section Midyear Meeting, 2007 CAR Conference, McMaster
University, and 2008 University of Oklahoma Accounting and Ethics conference for
comments. We thank Kelly Huang, Nan Liu, and Drew Newman for their research
assistance.
1. Although the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) oversees the ﬁnancial indus-
try, it delegates the regulatory duties to the NASD and New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE). When we began this study, the NASD was the industry’s largest regulatory
body; however, the NASD and NYSE have since consolidated most of their operations
into the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA; Davies 2007).
2. For example, Barber et al. (2006) examine industry regulation requiring analyst research
reports to disclose the percentage of their recommendations that are buys, holds, and
sells.
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inputs to other research outputs such as stock recommendations (Loh and
Mian 2006), target price forecasts (Bandyopadhyay, Brown, and Richardson
1995), valuation models (Frankel and Lee 1998), and growth and return on
equity investment models (Easton et al. 2002). We focus on the accuracy of
earnings forecasts because of its importance to investors (O’Brien 1991;
Stickel 1992; Mikhail, Walther, and Willis 1997; Clement 1999; Loh and
Mian 2006), and on the credibility of analysts’ earnings forecast revisions
because prior research reveals that investors consider a number of forecast
factors in addition to past accuracy when evaluating the expected accuracy
of an analyst’s forecast (Stickel 1992; Clement and Tse 2003; Bonner,
Walther, and Young 2003).
We hand-collect a sample of ﬁnancial analysts with background disclo-
sure events (hereafter ‘‘disclosed analysts’’). There are eight types of back-
ground disclosures: criminal actions, customer complaints, bankruptcies,
regulatory actions, terminations, civil judicial actions, investigations, and
judgments ⁄ liens.3 Because the primary focus of our study is to examine the
potential beneﬁts of using background disclosures for ex ante uninformed
investors seeking earnings research, we require disclosed analysts’ research
outputs to be available in the period after the date of the original incident
— that is, when an uninformed investor could potentially beneﬁt from con-
ducting a search of public disclosures on the analyst of interest. Hereafter,
we refer to this date as the ‘‘incident date’’.4
Because we are the ﬁrst to study disclosed analysts, we provide descrip-
tive statistics, beginning with the frequency of analysts’ earnings forecasts
and the types of ﬁrms that they follow. We ﬁnd that about 16 percent of
ﬁrm-quarters at the intersection of the I ⁄B ⁄E ⁄S and our hand-collected
NASD databases have at least one disclosed analyst making an earnings
forecast. Relative to nondisclosed analysts (i.e., analysts in the NASD data-
base without disclosure events), disclosed analysts tend to follow ﬁrms with
larger sales, earnings, and market capitalizations; smaller proﬁtability; lower
book-to-market ratios; and less debt in their capital structures. Because ﬁrm
characteristics differ between ﬁrms followed by disclosed versus non-
disclosed analysts, and because these characteristics may affect forecasting
difﬁculty and stock returns, we match disclosed analysts to a control group
of nondisclosed analysts by ﬁrm-quarter for both our accuracy and market
tests.
Relying on ﬁrm-quarter relative measures, descriptive analyses of fore-
casting characteristics indicate that, compared to nondisclosed analysts,
disclosed analysts forecast less accurately in both the current and prior four
3. The Appendix provides examples of speciﬁc disclosure events. Table 2 shows the fre-
quency of analysts’ background disclosures by type of event.
4. When there is more than one disclosure event, we use the date of the ﬁrst disclosure as
the incident date, reasoning that this is the ﬁrst date when a disclosure event concerning
the analyst is publicly known.
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quarters, later in the quarter, and more frequently. They make their fore-
casts with greater delay relative to other analysts, follow more ﬁrms, work
for brokerage ﬁrms of similar size, have more experience, have more job
turnover, and are more consistent in the speciﬁc ﬁrms they follow. Past
research has shown that many of these forecast characteristics are related to
both forecast accuracy and market reaction, consequently we include them
in our accuracy and market models.
Our forecasting performance model evaluates the quarterly earnings
forecast accuracy of disclosed analysts by regressing earnings forecast
accuracy on the disclosed analyst indicator variable and controls. Consis-
tent with the notion that disclosed analysts’ earnings forecasts are less
reliable, we ﬁnd that disclosed analysts’ earnings forecasts are less accu-
rate than those of nondisclosed analysts following the same ﬁrm-quarters.
In supplemental analyses, we investigate whether this accuracy result is
due to our disclosure variable capturing some persistent, unmeasured ana-
lyst characteristic versus being a product of the disclosure event per se.
Based on several analyses, including examining disclosed analysts’ fore-
casts in the predisclosure period, the impact of multiple disclosure events,
and the effect of elapsed time since the disclosure event, the totality of
the evidence suggests the disclosure event signals a persistent analyst
characteristic.
To determine the market credibility of disclosed analysts’ earnings
research, we examine the short-window market reaction to analysts’ earn-
ings forecast revisions. Controlling for ﬁrm-level variables and analyst
forecasting characteristics, we ﬁnd a weaker market reaction to forecast
revisions by disclosed analysts relative to those by nondisclosed analysts.
We interpret this ﬁnding as indicating investors consider forecast revisions
by analysts with disclosures to be less credible. We do not ﬁnd a weaker
market reaction to disclosed analysts’ forecasts in the pre-incident period,
suggesting the market is unaware of the analyst characteristic signaled by
the disclosure prior to its release.
To gain perspective on whether market segments varying in sophisti-
cation respond differently to disclosed versus nondisclosed analysts’ fore-
cast revisions, we evaluate variation in trade size surrounding forecast
revisions. Relative to small traders, we ﬁnd stronger reactions by larger
traders to analyst forecasts in general, but we do not ﬁnd large inves-
tors discount disclosed analysts’ forecasts to a greater extent than small
investors.
A natural question arising from our results is why analysts with dis-
closure events remain employed at brokerage houses. We suggest several
reasons for their continuing employment. First, their relatively poor
performance with respect to forecasting and market credibility does not
preclude the possibility that they are superior to analyst candidates who are
not employed at brokerage ﬁrms. Second, we focus on earnings research,
taking into account that analysts perform other important tasks, such as
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writing reports, making stock recommendations, and forecasting target
prices. It is conceivable that disclosed analysts outperform other analysts in
these research tasks. Third, disclosed analysts may add less value than non-
disclosed analysts, but satisfy a minimum threshold and are are paid less in
equilibrium.
Our study is important for several reasons. First, we add to the
evidence that investors act as if past accuracy is not all that matters when
reacting to analyst earnings forecast revisions. Stickel (1992) ﬁnds that
investors react more to forecast revisions of analysts who are members of
the Institutional Investor All-American team, and Clement and Tse (2003)
show that investors react to a variety of analyst characteristics beyond past
accuracy. We identify analyst background as another important characteris-
tic that is associated with both forecasting accuracy and investor response
to analyst revisions.
Second, in the aftermath of recent Wall Street analyst scandals, there
have been calls for reforming the research analyst profession. During the
congressional ‘‘Analyzing the Analysts’’ hearings in June–July 2001, the
efﬁcacy of the current model of brokerage industry self-regulation was
called into question (Boni and Womack 2002). Although a summary exami-
nation of the efﬁcacy of brokerage industry self-regulation is beyond the
scope of our study, in the spirit of Barber et al. (2006) we add to the knowl-
edge of the current state of industry regulation by examining the association
between this self-regulatory disclosure mechanism and analysts’ accuracy
and credibility.
Third, investors rate integrity and professionalism as one of the most
important attributes of an equity research ﬁrm (Institutional Investor 2006).5
Indeed, this attribute increased the most in importance among analyst attri-
butes between 1998 and 2005 (Bradshaw 2006). While some of the eight
types of NASD disclosures overlap well with integrity and professionalism
(e.g., criminal actions), admittedly others are more loosely connected (e.g.,
bankruptcies). To the extent that, collectively, these disclosures provide a
reasonable — albeit noisy — proxy for integrity and professionalism, we
provide evidence associating these characteristics with research performance
and credibility.
We organize our paper as follows. The next section describes the
institutional background and related literature. Section 3 describes the
speciﬁcation of our empirical tests. Section 4 describes our sample
selection and provides results. Section 5 contains the results of supple-
mentary analyses. Section 6 relates several sensitivity analyses and section
7 concludes.
5. It is the third most important attribute of the 12 examined. The most important
attribute is industry knowledge.
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2. Institutional background and related literature
Brokerage industry background disclosures
Created by the NASD in 1988, the public disclosure program provides
investors with a mechanism for gaining knowledge of the background and
conduct of registered investment professionals (NASD 2006).6 According to
the NASD, their public disclosure database was accessed more than 4
million times during 2006 by users who requested more than 200,000
reports (these reports are generated only in cases of actual instances of
disclosure events, e.g., a past criminal conviction).7 NASD disclosure events
are based on information in the Central Registration Depository and
include self-reported information from investment professionals (Form U-4
of the Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration or
Transfer), brokerage ﬁrms (Form BD of the Uniform Application for
Broker-Dealer Registration and Form U-5), and governmental agencies
such as the SEC (NASD 2006). As one example, Form U-5 is ﬁled by a
brokerage ﬁrm each time an investment professional leaves a ﬁrm; its
purpose is to explain the reason for the separation (Slater 2007).
Critics of the NASD disclosure program argue that, because the NASD
is supported ﬁnancially by the ﬁrms it seeks to regulate, this support leads
to conﬂicts of interest with respect to providing investors with a full and
objective reporting of relevant disclosures (Loomis 2002; Jamieson 2006;
Siedle 2006). Critics also maintain that NASD disclosures provide limited
beneﬁts to investors because they exclude important events such as cus-
tomer settlements of under $10,000. In addition to criticizing the guidelines
per se, some have accused the NASD of understating reportable events and
of allowing ﬁrms to expunge their records too liberally (Siedle 2006; Davies
2007).
Earnings forecasting performance
Prior literature has shown variation in earnings forecasting accuracy condi-
tional on a number of factors, including forecast horizon (Crichﬁeld,
Dyckman, and Lakonishok 1978; O’Brien 1988), forecast frequency (Jacob,
Lys, and Neale 1999), days since the last forecast (e.g., Clement and Tse
2003), number of industries and ﬁrms followed (Clement 1999), broker size
(Stickel 1995; Clement 1999), and experience (Mikhail et al. 1997; Clement
1999; Jacob et al. 1999). We consider analyst type — those with and
6. Although no evidence on the effectiveness of the NASD disclosure program exists to
date, a similar disclosure program is being considered by the Internal Revenue Service.
In particular, the agency would make public the names of tax attorneys and accountants
under investigation for rules violations (Matthews 2006).
7. Investors can learn about an analyst’s or other investment professional’s background
via the FINRA which maintains the BrokerCheck system, an online tool available for
no charge at http: ⁄ ⁄www.ﬁnra.org. When we began our study, the NASD maintained
this database.
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without background disclosures — as an additional factor impacting fore-
cast accuracy.8 Because an analyst’s prior accuracy is related to her future
forecast accuracy (Sinha, Brown, and Das 1997; Brown 2001), investors can
beneﬁt ex ante from knowledge of an analyst’s type.
There are two reasons suggesting a link between background disclosures
and analyst performance. First, as an industry regulator, the NASD has
both the specialized knowledge and incentives to safeguard the brokerage
industry’s reputation and to avoid external intervention by providing infor-
mative disclosures to market participants. We maintain that the primary
way for these disclosures to be viewed as informative is that they have per-
formance implications. As one example of a disclosure position, the NASD
reveals past brokerage industry terminations, and, empirically, analyst job
turnover has been linked to poor earnings forecasting accuracy (Mikhail,
Walther, and Willis 1999).
Second, the expertise literature considers domain knowledge to be an
important component of superior task performance (e.g., Chase and Simon
1973; Chi, Glaser, and Rees 1982). Analysts with disclosures may have
violated regulatory and industry guidelines due, in part, to their lack of
training and the requisite knowledge of the boundaries of appropriate con-
duct in the ﬁnancial service sector. Thus, ﬁnance training or knowledge deﬁ-
ciencies may contribute to their inferior performance relative to their peers.
On the other hand, there are two reasons suggesting the absence of a
link between background disclosures and analyst performance. First, there
is skepticism surrounding the NASD’s conﬂict of interest in serving a dual
role as promoter of its constituents’ interests and as a regulator, resulting in
challenges to the efﬁcacy of the public disclosure program (Loomis 2002;
Jamieson 2006; Siedle 2006; Davies 2007). Second, the disclosed analysts in
the NASD database are still employed, so their earnings research outputs
may not be less accurate.
While the accuracy of disclosed analysts’ forecasts is an empirical issue,
we expect industry incentives to safeguard reputation and avoid external
intervention outweigh conﬂicts of interest.9 Using earnings forecast accuracy
to proxy for analyst earnings research performance, our ﬁrst hypothesis is:
8. We use the term ‘‘analyst type’’ when referring to analysts to differentiate an analyst
characteristic from other factors affecting forecast accuracy. For example, forecast char-
acteristics (e.g., early versus late in the period), brokerage ﬁrm characteristics (e.g., small
versus large), and followed-company characteristics (e.g., domestic versus multinational)
may affect earnings forecast accuracy. Similarly, analyst characteristics — for example,
team versus individual (Brown and Hugon 2009), male versus female (Green, Jegadeesh,
and Tang 2008) — may affect earnings forecast accuracy.
9. Importantly, the beneﬁts of industry reputation brought on by the perception of a
well-functioning regulatory body accrue to all ﬁrms, while the short-horizon beneﬁt of a
particular ﬁrm wishing not to disclose an analyst transgression accrues primarily idio-
syncratically. We reason that organizations have incentives to act in the interests of their
larger base of constituents.
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HYPOTHESIS 1. Analysts with background disclosures forecast earnings
relatively less accurately than do analysts without background
disclosures.
Market credibility of earnings forecast revisions
Prior research on analyst earnings forecast revisions reveals that forecast
revisions are price informative in the sense that they are associated with
short-window market reactions centered on forecast revisions (e.g., Givoly
and Lakonishok 1979; Imhoff and Lobo 1984; Stickel 1992; Park and Stice
2000; Clement and Tse 2003; Gleason and Lee 2003; Bonner et al. 2003;
Bonner et al. 2007). Consistent with intuition, research has also established
that past forecast performance is valued by the market and is an important
predictor of future performance (Brown 2001). However, because earnings
forecast accuracy is an ex post realization, contemporaneous factors add
incrementally to determining the accuracy of an analyst’s current earnings
forecast (see, e.g., Clement 1999; Jacob et al. 1999; Clement and Tse 2003;
Bonner et al. 2003).10
The market credibility of an earnings forecast, proxied via a short-
window market reaction, can be viewed as a summary of the assortment of
factors associated with ex post accuracy. Consistent with the market pricing
analyst traits associated with accuracy, Stickel (1992) shows that the market
pays more attention to earnings forecast revisions by members of the
Institutional Investor All-American Research Team.11
We posit that market participants will recognize either the credibility
attributes of analysts or reasonable proxies of these attributes and weight
their earnings expectations accordingly. Because disclosed analysts have
instances in their backgrounds revealing less credible patterns of behav-
ior, our second hypothesis relates to the market perception of their
research.
HYPOTHESIS 2. The short-window market reaction to disclosed analysts’
earnings forecast revisions is weaker than that to nondisclosed
analysts’ revisions.
Differential reliance on analyst disclosures conditional on investor sophistication
In the market reaction analysis, we examine the potential beneﬁts of using
background disclosures for investors who are uninformed as to an analyst’s
type. More speciﬁcally, we ask the question: Can uninformed investors gain
the knowledge of informed investors on a dimension of analyst credibility
10. For example, analysts with a high level of past performance may exhibit deteriorating
performance if their workloads increase.
11. Stickel (1992) also shows that earnings forecasts by members of the Institutional Investor
All-American Research Team are more accurate than those of nonmembers.
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through utilizing these public disclosures? We expect more sophisticated
investors to pay less attention to disclosed analysts’ earnings research than
do less sophisticated investors.
One of the important differences between more and less sophisticated
investors is the ﬁduciary responsibility and related legal accountability that
sophisticated investors such as institutions assume (Del Guercio 1996). Prior
research concludes that sophisticated investors consider the legal implica-
tions of their responsibilities when making investment choices (Del Guercio
1996; Badrinath, Gay, and Kale 1989; Gompers and Metrick 2001). There-
fore, we expect that sophisticated investors will be relatively less likely to
rely on earnings forecasts by analysts with public disclosures of question-
able conduct. Enhancing their ability to recognize these credibility attri-
butes, sophisticated investors are more proﬁcient at evaluating relevant
dimensions of brokerage research credibility (Bonner et al. 2003; Malmen-
dier and Shanthikumar 2004; Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy 2006). This
reasoning leads to our third hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 3. More sophisticated investors rely relatively less on disclosed
analysts’ earnings forecast revisions than do less sophisticated
investors.
3. Speciﬁcation of empirical tests
Earnings forecast accuracy performance
We designate analysts as disclosed if they have one or more of the eight
types of disclosure events in the NASD database as described in the
Appendix. Due to variation in earnings forecasting difﬁculty arising from
interﬁrm and temporal characteristics, we examine the performance of
disclosed analysts by matching them with nondisclosed analysts by ﬁrm-
quarter.12 Because we focus on the incremental beneﬁts of disclosure
information, we control for other known determinants of forecast accuracy.
Based on prior literature (Crichﬁeld et al. 1978; O’Brien 1988; Stickel 1995;
Mikhail et al. 1997; Mikhail et al. 1999; Clement 1999; Jacob et al. 1999;
Clement and Tse 2003), we control for forecast horizon, forecast frequency,
days since the last forecast, number of ﬁrms followed, broker size, experi-
ence, job turnover, and portfolio of companies followed.13 In addition,
because an analyst’s past forecast accuracy is related to his current accuracy
(Sinha et al. 1997; Brown and Mohammad 2010), we include past accuracy
12. All forecasts are made conditional upon knowledge of the same number of interim
quarterly earnings announcements. We rely on quarterly rather than annual observa-
tions because accuracy models using annual observations and controlling for forecast
horizon linearly do not adequately address differential information available to analysts
who forecast immediately prior to versus immediately after interim quarterly earnings
announcements.
13. Adding analyst-speciﬁc effects (Jacob et al. 1999) yields inferentially similar results.
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in an extended model to see if past accuracy subsumes the information
content of the disclosure events. Following Clement and Tse (2003), we use
a relative measure for accuracy and the control variables and evaluate an
analyst’s earnings forecast accuracy by estimating the following model:
ACCURi;j;t ¼ a0 þ a1DISCi;j;t þ Rkkk Forecast Controlsi;j;t þ ei;j;t ð1Þ:
The model variables are deﬁned as follows:
ACCURi,j,t = Forecast accuracy, calculated as the maximum absolute forecast
error for analysts who follow ﬁrm j in quarter t minus the abso-
lute forecast error of analyst i following ﬁrm j in quarter t, with
this difference scaled by the range of absolute forecast errors for
all analysts following ﬁrm j in quarter t. The forecast error is the
analyst’s earnings estimate minus the actual earnings. Higher
(lower) values of ACCUR correspond to better (worse) forecasting
accuracy.
DISCi,j,t = Disclosed analyst, an indicator variable equal to 1 for analysts
with background disclosures in the NASD database and 0 for ana-
lysts without background disclosures in the NASD database.
Forecast Controls
FCAGEi,j,t = Forecast age, calculated as the days from the forecast date to
the earnings announcement date for analyst i following ﬁrm j in
quarter t minus the minimum forecast horizon for all analysts
who follow ﬁrm j in quarter t, with this difference scaled by
the range of forecast horizons for analysts following ﬁrm j in
quarter t.
FCFREQi,j,t = Forecast frequency, calculated as the number of ﬁrm j forecasts
made by analyst i following ﬁrm j in quarter t minus the minimum
number of ﬁrm j forecasts for analysts following ﬁrm j in quarter
t, with this difference scaled by the range of the number of ﬁrm j
forecasts issued by analysts following ﬁrm j in quarter t.
DAYSi,j,t = Number of days between analyst i’s forecast of ﬁrm j’s earnings in
quarter t and the most recent preceding forecast of ﬁrm j’s earn-
ings by any analyst, minus the minimum number of days between
two adjacent forecasts of ﬁrm j’s earnings by any two analysts in
quarter t, with this difference scaled by the range of days between
two adjacent forecasts of ﬁrm j’s earnings in quarter t.
NOFIRMi,j,t = Number of ﬁrms followed, calculated as the number of companies
followed by analyst i following ﬁrm j in quarter t minus the mini-
mum number of companies followed by analysts who follow ﬁrm
j in quarter t, with this difference scaled by the range in the
number of companies followed by analysts following ﬁrm j in
quarter t.
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BSIZEi,j,t = Brokerage size, calculated as the number of analysts employed by
the brokerage house employing analyst i following ﬁrm j in quar-
ter t minus the minimum number of analysts employed by a bro-
kerage house for analysts following ﬁrm j in quarter t, with this
difference scaled by the range of brokerage size for analysts fol-
lowing ﬁrm j in quarter t.
EXPi,j,t = Forecasting experience, calculated as the number of prior forecast-
ing quarters for analyst i following ﬁrm j minus the minimum
number of prior forecasting quarters for analysts following ﬁrm j
in quarter t, with this difference scaled by the range of prior fore-
casting quarters for analysts following ﬁrm j in quarter t.
TURNi,j,t = Analyst turnover, calculated as an indicator variable equal to 1 if
analyst i changes brokerage houses during the year or leaves the
I ⁄B ⁄E ⁄S database and does not reappear by the end of the sample
period and equal to 0 otherwise, minus the minimum turnover for
analysts following ﬁrm j in quarter t, with this difference scaled by
the range of turnover for analysts following ﬁrm j in quarter t.
PORTi,j,t = Analyst portfolio turnover, calculated as the annual percentage
change in ﬁrms followed by analyst i in quarter t minus the mini-
mum change for analysts following ﬁrm j in quarter t, with this
difference scaled by the range of change for analysts following
ﬁrm j in quarter t.
ACCPASTi,j,t = Past forecast accuracy, calculated as ACCUR above except that an
analyst’s prior period forecasting accuracy is measured as the med-
ian of the age-adjusted forecast errors across all ﬁrms forecasted
during the prior four quarters, where the age-adjusted errors are
the residuals from ﬁrm-quarter-speciﬁc regressions of the absolute
forecast error on the forecast age.
ei,j,t = Error term.
We use (1) to evaluate Hypothesis 1 that disclosed analysts forecast
relatively less accurately than do nondisclosed analysts.14 A positive
(negative) coefﬁcient on the DISC dummy variable indicates higher (lower)
quarterly earnings forecast accuracy for disclosed analysts relative to that of
the matched sample of nondisclosed analysts, and Hypothesis 1 predicts the
coefﬁcient estimate on DISC to be negative.
Market credibility: Short-window reaction to earnings revisions
We examine the market credibility of disclosed analysts’ earnings forecasts
by comparing the market reaction to disclosed analysts’ earnings forecast
revisions to those of nondisclosed analysts for a given ﬁrm-quarter. When
14. We supplement this model with several sensitivity analyses, including evaluating
nonlinear proxies for brokerage ﬁrm status, alternative experience measures such as
ﬁrm-speciﬁc and industry experience, and alternative measure of lagged accuracy.
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computing earnings forecast revisions, we use the analyst’s most recent
prior forecast for ﬁrm j in quarter t as the benchmark because it is a
better proxy of investors’ earnings expectations for the particular analyst-
quarter than the prior consensus forecast (Imhoff and Lobo 1984; Stickel
1991; Gleason and Lee 2003). We use the following model to examine the
market reaction:
CARi;j;t ¼ b0 þ b1REVPi;j;t þ b2DISCi;j;t þ b3REVPi;j;tDISCi;j;t
þ Rm/mControlsi;j;t þ RncnREVPi;j;tControlsi;j;t þ xi;j;t
ð2Þ:
The variables not previously deﬁned are:
CAR i,j,t = The three-day cumulative market-adjusted stock returns of com-
pany j surrounding analyst i’s forecast revision in quarter t.15
REVP i,j,t = Analyst i’s price-deﬂated earnings forecast revision for ﬁrm j in
quarter t.
Firm Controls
BM j,t = Beginning of the quarter book-to-market ratio deﬁned as
COMPUSTAT items Data59 ⁄ (Data14 x Data61).
SIZE j,t = Beginning of the quarter ﬁrm size deﬁned as ln (Data14 x
Data61).
BETA j,t = Beta obtained from a ﬁrm-speciﬁc regression of the ﬁrm’s daily
return on the value-weighted market index daily return using the
100 trading days ending 10 days before the forecast revision date.
FOLLOW j,t = The number of independent analysts following ﬁrm j in quarter t.
x i,j,t = Error term.
We use (2) to evaluate Hypothesis 2. A signiﬁcant positive (negative)
coefﬁcient for the interaction term REVP*DISC indicates investors react
relatively more (less) to forecast revisions by disclosed analysts than to
those of the matched sample of nondisclosed analysts. Hypothesis 2
predicts that the coefﬁcient for the interaction term REVP*DISC will be
negative.
Differential reliance on disclosed analysts’ revisions conditional on investor
sophistication
More sophisticated investors, such as institutions, are better informed and
trade in larger order sizes than do less sophisticated investors (e.g., Lee 1992;
Lee and Radhakrishna 2000; Bhattacharya 2001; De Franco, Lu, and
Vasvari 2007). Consistent with Lee (1992) and more current applications
15. The market adjustment is value weighted; however, substituting an equal-weighted
adjustment or a ﬁve-day accumulation window for both value-weighted and equal-
weighted adjustments yields inferentially similar results.
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(e.g., De Franco et al. 2007) our investor classiﬁcation is based on the
dollar value of each intraday transaction, where trades greater (less) than
$30,000 ($7,000) are considered large (small).16 The transaction data are
obtained from the NYSE TAQ intraday database. We measure abnormal
trading volume measure, AVOLUME, following Mikhail et al. (2007),
and deﬁne the year as the calendar year.17 To evaluate how different
investor segments vary their reliance on disclosures, we condition the
abnormal volume for each trade segment on our variable of interest,
DISC, and forecast and ﬁrm control variables consistent with the preced-
ing market model. The model is speciﬁed as follows:
AVOLUMEki;j;t ¼ dk0 þ dk1REVPi;j;t þ dk2DISCi;j;t þ dk3REVPi;j;tDISCi;j;t
þ Rm/kmControlsi;j;t þ RncknREVPi;j;tControlsj;t þ nki;j;t
ð3Þ:
The variables not previously deﬁned are as follows:
AVOLUMEki;j;t = Abnormal volume, calculated as the dollar trading volume for ﬁrm
j in investor group k during the three-day window centered on
analyst i’s earnings forecast revision minus the average dollar trad-
ing volume for ﬁrm j in investor group k during three-day, non-
overlapping windows during the year, scaled by the average dollar
trading volume for ﬁrm j in investor group k during three-day,
nonoverlapping windows during the year.
nki;j;t = Error term.
We estimate (3) separately for small and large traders, represented by
the superscript k, using a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) approach to
test for differences between coefﬁcients across the two separate models. In
both the large and small trade size models, the estimated coefﬁcient on the
term REVP indicates the response to nondisclosed analysts’ revisions after
controlling for the remaining factors. REVP*DISC indicates whether the
unexpected trade size reaction to forecast revisions varies when conditioned
on the disclosed analyst indicator, and the sum of REVP and REVP*DISC
indicates the response to disclosed analysts’ revisions. Evidence consistent
with Hypothesis 3 would include a greater negative market reaction to dis-
closed analysts’ revisions for more versus less sophisticated investors, as well
as a negative incremental reaction to disclosed analysts. The latter result is
necessary to ensure differentiation between reactions to nondisclosed versus
disclosed analysts.
16. Following this line of literature, we also consider alternative dollar-based and volume-
based classiﬁcations to identify large and small traders.
17. In untabulated results, we obtain similar evidence when we deﬁne the year as 125
trading days before and after an analyst forecast revision date.
1036 Contemporary Accounting Research
CAR Vol. 27 No. 4 (Winter 2010)
4. Sample selection and results
Sample selection
Table 1 reports the sample selection procedures. Our sample selection
begins with quarterly forecast observations in the I ⁄B ⁄E ⁄S database during
the period 1990–2005. We use 1990 as a starting point because in earlier
years this database suffered a time lag in recording forecasts (Keane and
Runkle 1998). We apply screens for missing data and omit both stale fore-
casts (those greater than 90 days in age) and anonymous analysts (those
with 00000 codes). Consistent with prior research (O’Brien 1991; Clement
1999; Jacob et al. 1999; Mikhail et al. 1999), we use the last earnings fore-
cast (the most recent) issued by an analyst for each ﬁrm-quarter combina-
tion, retaining 971,282 quarterly earnings forecasts.
We intersect the quarterly forecast sample with our hand-collected
database of analyst disclosure events. Several steps are required in order to
construct this database. Analysts are uniquely identiﬁed only by an analyst
code in the I ⁄B ⁄E ⁄S earnings forecast database; therefore, to retrieve their
names, we utilize a broker translation ﬁle which contains analyst codes
along with their ﬁrst initials and last names. Because the broker translation
ﬁle does not contain a complete ﬁrst name, we supplement it with Nelson’s
Directory of Investment Services. For remaining ambiguous or missing
analyst ﬁrst names we use Google and search the string: last_name and
brokerage_house_name and analyst. We next use our completed ﬁle of analyst
names (those that can be linked to analyst codes) to query the NASD data-
base. Querying the database requires manually inputting each analyst’s ﬁrst
name, last name, and brokerage house name into relevant search ﬁelds and,
in the event of a background disclosure event, retrieving a research report.
To control for known disclosures, we include only analysts who can be
identiﬁed unambiguously in the NASD database. There are three possible
results of a search in the NASD database based on our constructed name
ﬁle: (1) matching the analyst name in our ﬁle to an observation in the
NASD database and ﬁnding no disclosure event, (2) matching the analyst
name in our ﬁle to an observation in the NASD database and ﬁnding a dis-
closure event, and (3) an inability to retrieve the analyst’s name in our ﬁle
from the NASD database. To mitigate noise in our sample arising from
analysts with past disclosure events that are not in the NASD database, we
retain only the ﬁrst two search results. This yields 3,055 analysts without
and 91 analysts with disclosure events.
After intersecting the I ⁄B ⁄E ⁄S sample with the hand-collected database
of NASD analyst disclosure events, our sample consists of 642,780 ﬁrm-
quarters. Because descriptive analyses reveal a number of differences
between the ﬁnancial characteristics of ﬁrms that disclosed analysts cover
relative to those not covered, we limit our sample to ﬁrms covered by at least
one disclosed and one nondisclosed analyst, enabling us to control for the
ﬁrm itself. This requirement reduces our sample to 118,339 ﬁrm-quarters.
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TABLE 1
Sample selection






I ⁄B ⁄E ⁄S quarterly earnings
forecasts, 1990–2005
1,610,177 (13,556) — —
Sample after omitting missing
data, stale forecasts, etc.
1,308,948 (12,917) — —
Sample limited to one forecast (most
recent) per analyst in a ﬁrm-quarter
971,282 (12,917) — —
Intersection of earnings forecasts and
NASD coding (the NASD coding
contains 3,146 total, 91 disclosed
analysts, and 3,055 non-disclosed
analysts)
642,780 (3,084) 22,649 (89) 620,131 (2,995)
To control for ﬁrm and temporal
characteristics, sample limited to
ﬁrm-quarters followed by at least
one disclosed and nondisclosed
analyst
118,339 (2,346) 19,356 (88) 99,043 (2,258)
Addition of forecasting control
variables
68,807 (1,936) 11,429 (79) 57,378 (1,857)
Earnings forecasting sample:
To allow tests from an ex ante
uninformed investor perspective,
only ﬁrm-quarters associated with a
disclosed analyst postincident date
or a nondisclosed analyst
forecasting in the same
ﬁrm-quarter are included
52,299 (1,812) 7,536 (73) 44,763 (1,739)
Market reaction to forecast revisions
sample:
Earnings forecast revisions requiring
a prior forecast by the same analyst
in the same ﬁrm-quarter CRSP and
COMPUSTAT data requirements
16,737 (1,549) 1,902 (65) 14,835 (1,450)
Trade size response to forecast revisions
sample:
Earnings forecast revisions. 16,433 (1,506) 1,835 (64) 14,598 (1,442)
CRSP, COMPUSTAT, and
TAQ ⁄ ISSM data requirements
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Because we focus on beneﬁts of disclosures to those investors who are
uninformed as to an analyst’s background, we restrict our sample to ana-
lysts’ forecasts after the initial date of the disclosed incident, resulting in
52,299 ﬁrm-quarters. We use this sample for our primary earnings forecast
accuracy tests, but to compute the market reaction and trade size tests for
the earnings forecast revisions, we also require prior earnings forecast
(to compute the revision) and necessary CRSP, COMPUSTAT, and
TAQ ⁄ ISSM (for the trade size analysis) data. Our samples for the market
reaction and trade size tests consist of 16,737 and 16,433 observations,
respectively.
Descriptive statistics
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on disclosed analysts and disclosure
frequency by event type. The number of disclosure events (n = 116) exceeds
the number of analysts with disclosures (n = 91) because several analysts
have multiple disclosure events. The disclosed analysts have the following
breakdown of disclosed incidents: 27 criminal actions (23.2 percent), 26 cus-
tomer complaints (22.4 percent), 18 bankruptcies (15.5 percent), 17 regula-
tory actions (14.7 percent), 17 terminations (14.7 percent), 5 civil judicial
actions (4.3 percent), 3 investigations (2.6 percent), and 3 judgments ⁄ liens
(2.6 percent). The Appendix provides an example of each of the eight dis-
closure categories.
Table 3 compares ﬁrm characteristics between ﬁrms followed and
those not followed by disclosed analysts. Relative to nondisclosed ana-
lysts, disclosed analysts follow ﬁrms with greater sales revenue and earn-
ings but smaller proﬁtability as measured by return on assets.18 Disclosed
analysts follow larger ﬁrms (as measured by market value), ﬁrms with
lower book-to-market ratios, and ﬁrms with less ﬁnancial leverage as mea-
sured by the debt-to-equity ratio. All samples in the remaining tables are
based on ﬁrm-quarters with at least one disclosed and one nondisclosed
analyst.
Table 4 compares disclosed to nondisclosed analysts with respect to
their forecast sample characteristics. Relying on ﬁrm-quarter relative
measures, descriptive analyses of forecasting characteristics indicate that,
compared to nondisclosed analysts, disclosed analysts forecast less accu-
rately in the current and prior year’s same quarter, later in the quarter,
and more frequently.19 Disclosed analysts make their forecasts with greater
delay relative to other analysts’ prior forecasts, follow more ﬁrms, have
18. These statements are based on Wilcoxon z-tests and two-tailed p-values; differences
based on t-tests and two-tailed p-values are consistent except for the return on assets
result which is insigniﬁcant based on a t-test.
19. These statements are based on Wilcoxon z-tests and two-tailed p-values; differences
based on t-tests and two-tailed p-values are consistent except for the insigniﬁcance of
portfolio turnover and past accuracy.
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more experience, have greater job turnover, and display more consistency
in the speciﬁc ﬁrms they follow. Past research on analyst forecast accuracy
has shown that these forecast characteristics are related to forecast
TABLE 2
Frequency of analyst background disclosures by disclosure event type
Disclosure event Frequency % of Total
Criminal actions 27 23.2
Customer complaints 26 22.4
Bankruptcies 18 15.5
Regulatory actions 17 14.7
Terminations 17 14.7
Civil judicial actions 5 4.3
Investigations 3 2.6
Judgments ⁄ liens 3 2.6
Total 116 100%
Notes:
This table provides descriptive statistics on analysts in the hand-collected NASD
sample with at least one disclosure event in the NASD database. The number
of total disclosure events (n = 116) exceeds the number of unique analysts
(n = 91) because some analysts have multiple disclosure events. A disclosure
event is represented by any of the following categories: Criminal actions,
which include all felony charges and convictions and speciﬁed investment-
related misdemeanor charges and convictions; Customer complaints, which
include written consumer-initiated complaints reported within the past
24 months alleging sales practice violations and damages of $5,000 or more,
or written consumer-initiated complaints reported within the past 24 months
alleging forgery, theft, misappropriation or conversion of funds or securities,
or consumer-initiated complaints alleging sales practice violations that settled
for $10,000 or more; Bankruptcies, which include personal bankruptcies; Reg-
ulatory actions, which include actions taken by the SEC, Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, other federal regulatory agencies, states, self-regulatory
organizations, or foreign ﬁnancial regulatory authorities resulting in a viola-
tion and ⁄or incident; Terminations, which include employment terminations
after allegations of a violation of investment-related statutes, regulations,
rules, or industry standards of misconduct, fraud or wrongful taking of prop-
erty, or failure to supervise in connection with investment-related activity;
Civil judicial actions such as injunctions entered in connection with invest-
ment-related activities; Investigations, pending investigations and regulatory
proceedings that could result in a regulatory action; and Judgments ⁄ liens,
which include unsatisﬁed judgments and liens. Speciﬁc examples of disclosure
events are provided in the Appendix.
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accuracy and market reaction so we include them in our accuracy and
market tests.
Table 5 reports Pearson and Spearman correlations for standardized
quarterly accuracy and forecasting control variables. Consistent with our
ﬁrst hypothesis, ﬁrm-quarter relative forecasting accuracy is negatively
associated with the disclosed analyst indicator variable.20 Consistent with
past research, current forecasting accuracy is positively related to past
TABLE 3











n = 122,634 Test of differences
Mean Median Mean Median T-test Wilcoxon Z
Sales 1259 312 581 124 34.09*** 50.54***
Earnings 81.03 17.44 33.97 5.71 28.17*** 35.52***
ROE 0.012 0.028 0.012 0.029 0.02 )1.01
ROA 0.004 0.008 0.005 0.009 )1.47 )2.17**
Size 7603 2045 2915 611 37.13*** 70.79***
BM 0.494 0.429 0.539 0.458 )14.15*** )11.85***
Debt to Equity 0.683 0.352 0.793 0.354 )10.00*** )2.48*
Notes:
This table reports a comparison of the ﬁnancial characteristics of Firms Followed by
Analysts with Disclosures and Firms Not Followed by Analysts with Disclosures
during our sample period 1990–2005. The table reports means (medians) for
all ﬁrm-quarter ﬁnancial variables in the sample representing the intersection
of analysts identiﬁed in the NASD database, I ⁄B ⁄E ⁄S quarterly earnings
forecasts, and COMPUSTAT required data on the reported variables.
The variables are deﬁned by the reported COMPUSTAT data items:
Sales = Data2, Earnings = Data8, Return on equity (ROE) = Data8 ⁄
Data59, Return on assets (ROA) = Data8 ⁄Data44, Size = Data14 x Data61,
Book-to-market ratio (BM) = Data59 ⁄ (Data14 x Data61), and Debt to
Equity = Data51 ⁄Data59. The variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentiles.
* Two-tailed p < 0.10; ** two-tailed p < 0.05; *** two-tailed p < 0.01.
20. These statements are based on Spearman correlations and two-tailed p-values; results
based on Pearson correlations and two-tailed p-values are consistent.
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TABLE 4








n = 44,763 Test of differences
Mean Median Mean Median T-test Wilcoxon Z
ACCUR 0.621 0.700 0.645 0.716 )5.30*** )2.03**
ACCPAST 0.600 0.601 0.603 0.626 )1.15 )4.51***
FCAGE 0.430 0.326 0.473 0.386 )8.80*** )12.56***
FCFREQ 0.396 0.500 0.343 0.333 11.02*** 11.78***
DAYS 0.303 0.088 0.208 0.028 20.56*** 23.01***
NOFIRM 0.558 0.545 0.422 0.381 29.58*** 28.96***
BSIZE 0.450 0.396 0.450 0.412 )0.07 )1.22
EXP 0.501 0.461 0.379 0.286 26.68*** 24.71***
TURN 0.321 0.000 0.270 0.000 11.16*** 14.53***
PORT 0.374 0.250 0.374 0.288 )0.03 )3.15***
Notes:
This table reports the means and medians for the standardized descriptive statistics
for the forecast sample. The variables are deﬁned as follows:
ACCUR = Forecast accuracy, calculated as the maximum absolute forecast error
for analysts who follow ﬁrm j in quarter t minus the absolute forecast
error of analyst i following ﬁrm j in quarter t, with this difference
scaled by the range of absolute forecast errors for all analysts follow-
ing ﬁrm j in quarter t. The forecast error is the analyst’s earnings esti-
mate minus the actual earnings. Higher (lower) values of ACCUR
correspond to better (worse) forecasting accuracy.
ACCPAST = Past forecast accuracy, calculated as ACCUR above except that an
analyst’s prior period forecasting accuracy is measured as the median
of the age-adjusted forecast errors across all ﬁrms forecasted during
the prior four quarters, where the age-adjusted errors are the
residuals from ﬁrm-quarter speciﬁc regressions of the absolute
forecast error on the forecast age.
FCAGE = Forecast age, calculated as the days from the forecast date to the
earnings announcement date for analyst i following ﬁrm j in quarter t
minus the minimum forecast horizon for all analysts who follow ﬁrm
j in quarter t, with this difference scaled by the range of forecast
horizons for analysts following ﬁrm j in quarter t.
(The table is continued on the next page.)
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forecasting accuracy, forecast frequency, experience, broker size, job turn-
over, and turnover in the portfolio of ﬁrms covered by an analyst. It is
negatively related to forecast age and the days since the prior forecast of
TABLE 4 (Continued)
FCFREQ = Forecast frequency, calculated as the number of ﬁrm j forecasts
made by analyst i following ﬁrm j in quarter t minus the minimum
number of ﬁrm j forecasts for analysts following ﬁrm j in quarter t,
with this difference scaled by the range of the number of ﬁrm j
forecasts issued by analysts following ﬁrm j in quarter t.
DAYS = The number of days between analyst i’s forecast of ﬁrm j’s earnings
in quarter t and the most recent preceding forecast of ﬁrm j’s earn-
ings by any analyst, minus the minimum number of days between
two adjacent forecasts of ﬁrm j’s earnings by any two analysts in
quarter t, with this difference scaled by the range of days between
two adjacent forecasts of ﬁrm j’s earnings in quarter t.
NOFIRM = The number of ﬁrms followed, calculated as the number of companies
followed by analyst i following ﬁrm j in quarter t minus the minimum
number of companies followed by analysts who follow ﬁrm j in quarter
t, with this difference scaled by the range in the number of companies
followed by analysts following ﬁrm j in quarter t.
BSIZE = Brokerage size, calculated as the number of analysts employed by the
brokerage house employing analyst i following ﬁrm j in quarter t
minus the minimum number of analysts employed by a brokerage
house for analysts following ﬁrm j in quarter t, with this difference
scaled by the range of brokerage size for analysts following ﬁrm j in
quarter t.
EXP = Forecasting experience, calculated as the number of prior forecasting
quarters for analyst i following ﬁrm j minus the minimum number of
prior forecasting quarters for analysts following ﬁrm j in quarter t,
with this difference scaled by the range of prior forecasting quarters
for analysts following ﬁrm j in quarter t.
TURN = Analyst turnover, calculated as an indicator variable equal to 1 if ana-
lyst i changes brokerage houses during the year or leaves the I ⁄B ⁄E ⁄S
database and does not reappear by the end of the sample period and
equal to 0 otherwise, minus the minimum turnover for analysts fol-
lowing ﬁrm j in quarter t, with this difference scaled by the range of
turnover for analysts following ﬁrm j in quarter t.
PORT = An analyst’s portfolio turnover, calculated as the annual percentage
change in ﬁrms followed by analyst i in quarter t minus the minimum
change for analysts following ﬁrm j in quarter t, with this difference
scaled by the range of change for analysts following ﬁrm j in quarter t.
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any analyst. Current forecasting accuracy is not signiﬁcantly related to the
number of ﬁrms covered.
Multivariate results
Earnings forecasting performance
Table 6 reports results from estimating (1) to evaluate the earnings forecast
accuracy of disclosed analysts. The model 1 estimation reveals a negative
and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on the disclosed analyst variable, DISC,
(a1 = )0.020, t = )2.58, p < 0.01), supporting our ﬁrst hypothesis that
TABLE 6
Analysts with and without disclosure events: Earnings forecast accuracy







Intercept 0.754 (117.72) *** 0.717 (89.63) ***
DISC ) )0.020 ()2.58) *** )0.023 ()2.62)***
FCAGE ) )0.177 ()32.85)*** )0.177 ()31.13)***
FCFREQ + 0.022 (4.74)*** 0.025 (5.01)***
DAYS ) )0.106 ()19.85)*** )0.102 ()18.28)***
NOFIRM ) )0.007 ()1.36) )0.007 ()1.31)
BSIZE + 0.016 (2.65)*** 0.015 (2.42)**
EXP + 0.003 (0.47) 0.002 (0.29)
TURN ) )0.029 ()6.53)*** )0.029 ()6.24)***
PORT ) )0.023 ()4.43)*** )0.026 ()4.64)***
ACCPAST + 0.069 (12.80)***
Adj. R2 4.54%*** 5.14%***
F-statistic 198.67 198.71
Notes:
This table reports results from estimating (1) to evaluate the earnings forecast
accuracy of disclosed (DISC) versus nondisclosed analysts during the
sample period 1990–2005. The sample consists of only ﬁrm-quarters with at
least one disclosed analyst and at least one nondisclosed analyst forecast.
All variables are deﬁned in the notes to Table 4. For each variable included
in (1), the coefﬁcient estimate is presented; the t-statistic is provided in
parentheses below the estimated coefﬁcient. The standard errors are
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and intra-analyst error correlation (Rogers
1994).
* Two-tailed p < 0.10; ** two-tailed p < 0.05; *** two-tailed p < 0.01.
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disclosed analysts forecast earnings less accurately than do analysts without
disclosures.21 Because we posit that uninformed investors can beneﬁt incre-
mentally from the NASD analyst disclosures, we also examine a second
model, model 2, which includes analysts’ past forecast accuracy,
ACCPAST. This extension allows us to test if the disclosures provide infor-
mation beyond that already incorporated in past accuracy. Consistent with
past research, the control variable ACCPAST is positive and signiﬁcant;
and germane to our ﬁrst hypothesis, DISC remains negative and signiﬁcant,
(a1 = )0.023, t = )2.62, p < 0.01). Interpreting the parameter estimate on
DISC, the unique contribution of the disclosed variable is to lower the
predicted relative accuracy by 2.3 percent.22
We make several efforts to enhance the robustness of our results. First,
we examine if the model 2 results are sensitive to alternative constructions
of the ACCPAST variable. Speciﬁcally, we substitute a ﬁrm-speciﬁc mea-
sure of accuracy for general accuracy and we obtain inferentially similar
results. Because different measures of experience exist in the forecasting lit-
erature, we examine the robustness of using general forecasting experience
as our experience control variable in models 1 and 2. In particular, we sub-
stitute both ﬁrm-speciﬁc forecasting experience and industry forecasting
experience for general experience and obtain similar results. Because the lit-
erature has used number of industries followed as well as number of ﬁrms
followed, we substitute the former for the latter in models 1 and 2, and
obtain inferentially similar results. Jacob et al. (1999) show the relevance of
analyst-speciﬁc effects when examining the determinants of relative forecast
accuracy. To allow for the coexistence of analyst effects with a disclosure
indicator variable, we eliminate one random pairing at a time, without
replacement, of a disclosed and a nondisclosed analyst indicator and
estimate n separate regressions, where n equals the number of disclosed
analysts. The mean parameter estimate on DISC after introducing analyst
speciﬁc effects remains negative and signiﬁcant (a1 = )0.060, t = )2.51,
p < 0.01).
Relevant to interpreting this accuracy result, in supplemental analyses
in section 5, we investigate whether the result is due to our disclosure
variable capturing some persistent, unmeasured analyst characteristic versus
the disclosure event per se. Based on several analyses, including examin-
ing disclosed analysts’ forecasts in the predisclosure period, the impact of
21. In regression models, reported t-statistics are based on standard errors adjusted for
heteroskedasticity and intra-analyst error correlation (Rogers 1994); however, our
results are insensitive to alternative strategies for addressing heteroskedasticity and
dependence of residuals, including White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics,
a quantile regression (Koenker and Bassett 1978), and t-statistics based on Newey and
West (1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors.
22. Because a relative accuracy measure lacks a direct economic interpretation, we also
examine the mean absolute forecast errors of disclosed (0.074) versus other analysts
(0.065), revealing an average forecast error 13.8 percent larger for disclosed analysts.
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multiple disclosure events, and the effect of elapsed time since the disclosure
event, we conclude our evidence is consistent with the disclosure event
signaling a persistent analyst characteristic.
Earnings forecast revision credibility
Table 7 reports results from estimating (2) to evaluate short-window mar-
ket reactions to disclosed versus nondisclosed analysts’ forecast revisions.23
We evaluate several variations of the market model including a base
model excluding control variables (model 1), a model with only forecast
control variables (model 2), a model with only ﬁrm control variables
(model 3), and a model with both forecast and ﬁrm control variables
(model 4). For brevity, we only report results based on model 4 in the
text. Consistent with prior literature, the estimated coefﬁcient on the
scaled forecast revision, REVP, is positive and statistically signiﬁcant
(b1 = 2.098, t = 2.63, p < 0.01), indicating that the short-window market
reaction centered on the release of the revision is associated with the
signed magnitude of the revision.24 Consistent with our second hypothesis,
the interaction term, REVP*DISC, is negative and signiﬁcant
(b3 = )0.198, t = )2.92, p < 0.01), indicating that market participants
pay less attention to the forecast revisions of analysts with disclosure
events. Calculating the partial derivative of REVP with respect to CAR
and using the unique estimates in the full model, b1 and b3, 2.098 and
)0.198 respectively, we evaluate the differential effect of DISC by compar-
ing results of DISC = 1 versus 0. Evaluating DISC = 1 yields a marginal
effect of 1.900 (=2.098)0.198), while DISC = 0 yields a marginal effect
of 2.098. Thus, the marginal effect of disclosure on the forecast revision
coefﬁcient is approximately 9.4 percent, which can be safely interpreted as
being economically meaningful.
We make several efforts to enhance the robustness of this result. The
tabulated results present a three-day return [)1, +1] where the market
adjustment is value weighted; however, in sensitivity checks, we use an
equal-weighted adjustment and utilize a ﬁve-day window [)2, +2] to
accumulate returns (for combinations of both value-weighted and
equal-weighted adjustments) with similar results. Prior literature has raised
concerns that other concurrent disclosures or economic events occurring
may affect price and cause analysts to revise their earnings forecasts (Chen,
Francis, and Schipper 2005). To address this concern, we evaluate the
single-day excess return [0, 0] with both equal-weighted and value-weighted
23. Across tables we winsorize at the 1 percent and 99 percent levels the continuous vari-
ables that are not otherwise standardized to avoid inferences based on extreme values ⁄
errors. As a sensitivity check, we omit both the winsorization procedure and the
minimum price deﬂator constraint and obtain similar results.
24. Due to space limitations, we exclude t-values in this table.
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TABLE 7
Analysts with and without disclosure events: Market reaction to the forecast
revisions
CARi;j;t ¼ b0 þ b1REVPi;j;t þ b2DISCi;;j;t þ b3REVPi;j;tDISCi;j;t þ Rm/mControlsi;j;t















Intercept )0.007*** )0.013*** )0.018*** )0.026***
REVP + 2.271*** 2.212*** 1.906** 2.098***
DISC )0.001 )0.002 0.000 )0.001
REVP*DISC ) )0.099*** )0.174*** )0.093*** )0.198***
Forecast Controls
FAGE 0.010*** 0.008***
REVP*FAGE + )0.181** )0.162*
FREQ 0.004** 0.006***
REVP*FREQ + 0.104 0.125
DAYS 0.011*** 0.011***
REVP*DAYS ) )0.116 )0.111
NFIRM 0.002 0.002
REVP*NFIRM ) 0.151** 0.183***
BSIZE 0.000 )0.001
REVP*BSIZE + )0.001 0.028
EXP )0.002 )0.002
REVP*EXP + )0.066 )0.057
TURN )0.001 )0.001
REVP* TURN 0.037 0.051
PORT )0.003 )0.001
REVP* PORT )0.055 )0.054
ACCPAST 0.001 0.001
REVP*ACCPAST + )0.109 )0.140
Firm Controls
BM )0.006** )0.005**
REVP*BM + )0.731** )0.934***
SIZE 0.002*** 0.002***
REVP*SIZE ) )0.027 )0.033
BETA )0.005*** )0.005***
REVP*BETA + 0.527*** 0.528***
FOLLOW )0.000 )0.000
(The table is continued on the next page.)
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adjustments and obtain results which are consistent with those of our
original analysis.
Differential reliance on analyst disclosures
Following prior literature, for example, Bhattacharya (2001), De Franco
et al. (2007), and Mikhail et al. (2007), we evaluate how investor segments
varying in sophistication respond to forecast revisions by disclosed analysts.
Consistent with the short-window market model, we relate abnormal vol-
ume for each trade segment to forecast revisions, our analyst disclosure
variable, and controls. The abnormal volume, AVOLUME, is deﬁned fol-
lowing Mikhail et al. 2007 as the dollar trading volume for ﬁrm j in investor
















REVP*FOLLOW + 0.000 )0.002
Adj. R2 7.28%*** 7.72%*** 8.26%*** 8.88%***
F-value 108.84 34.19 50.39 32.44
Notes:
This table reports results from estimating (2) to evaluate the market reaction to
earnings forecast revisions by disclosed (DISC) versus nondisclosed analysts
during the sample period 1990–2005. The sample consists of ﬁrm-quarters with
at least one disclosed analyst and at least one nondisclosed analyst forecast.
The dependent variable, CAR, is the three-day market-adjusted cumulative
stock return of company j surrounding analyst i’s forecast revision at time t.
REVP is analyst i’s price-deﬂated forecast revision for ﬁrm j at time t. The
Forecast Control variables and DISC are deﬁned in Tables 4 and 5,
respectively. The Firm Control variables are as follows: BM is the beginning
of the quarter book-to-market ratio deﬁned as COMPUSTAT
Data59 ⁄ (Data14 x Data61); SIZE is the beginning of the quarter ﬁrm size
deﬁned as ln (Data14 x Data61); BETA is obtained from a ﬁrm-speciﬁc
regression of the ﬁrm’s daily return on the value-weighted market index daily
return using the 100 trading days ending 10 days before the forecast revision
date; FOLLOW is the number of independent analysts following ﬁrm j in
quarter t. Across models, we calculate t-statistics based on standard errors
adjusted for both heteroskedasticity and intra-analyst error correlation
(Rogers 1994). CAR and REVP are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles;
the minimum price deﬂator for REVP is $1.
* Two-tailed p < 0.10; ** two-tailed p < 0.05; *** two-tailed p < 0.01.
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forecast revision minus the average dollar trading volume for ﬁrm j in inves-
tor group k during three-day, nonoverlapping windows during the year,
scaled by the average dollar trading volume for ﬁrm j in investor group k
during three-day, nonoverlapping windows during the year. We estimate (3)
separately for small (£ $7,000) and large (‡ $30,000) traders using a SUR
approach, which allows testing for differences between the coefﬁcients of
interest across the two separate models.
In both the large and small trade size models, the estimated coefﬁcient
on the term REVP indicates the response to nondisclosed analysts’ revisions
(after controlling for the remaining factors). REVP*DISC indicates whether
the unexpected trade size reaction to forecast revisions varies when condi-
tioned on the disclosed analyst indicator, and the sum of REVP and
REVP*DISC indicates the response to disclosed analysts’ revisions.
Table 8 reports a stronger large trader response to forecast revisions
by nondisclosed analysts after controlling for other factors, REVP,
(dlg1 ¼ 31:575> dsm1 ¼ 12:935, F = 289.07, p < 0.01). Evaluating the
sums of REVP and REVP*DISC, there is also a stronger large trader
response to revisions by disclosed analysts, REVP + REVP*DISC (dlg1 +
dlg3 > + d
sm
3 , 31.575 – 0.851 = 30.724 > 12.935 – 0.536 = 12.399, F =
306.06, p < 0.01). However, because neither trader reacts incrementally
differently to disclosed analysts, REVP*DISC, (dlg3 ¼ 0:851, t = )1.02,
p > 0.10; dsm3 ¼ 0:536, t = )1.49, p > 0.10), the totality of the results
merely reveals that large traders react more strongly to analysts in general.
This evidence does not support our third hypothesis that more sophisticated
investors rely relatively less on disclosed analysts’ earnings forecast revisions
than do less sophisticated investors.
5. Supplemental analyses
Evaluating explanations for the accuracy and market reaction results: Some
evidence from preincident analyses
Because our study seeks to determine the beneﬁts of using disclosures for ex
ante uninformed investors, we require disclosed analysts to be in our sample
after the date of the related incident — that is, when an uninformed investor
could beneﬁt from seeking background knowledge of the analyst of interest.
However, an examination of disclosed analysts’ forecasting patterns in the
preincident period can shed light on the underlying explanation of the
postincident results. For example, if disclosed analysts exhibit inferior fore-
casting accuracy only in the postincident period, the disclosure incident may
have driven the accuracy effect. That is, disclosed analysts’ inferior accuracy
may be due to fewer intra-ﬁrm resources available or deterioration of
communication channels with managers of the companies they follow. In
contrast, if analysts are similarly inaccurate in the preincident period, this
is consistent with the disclosure signal capturing a persistent unmeasured
analyst characteristic that is associated with analyst performance or ability.
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TABLE 8
Analysts with and without disclosure events: Abnormal trading volume in response
to forecast revisions
AVOLUMEki;j;t ¼ dk0 þ dk1REVPi;j;t þ dk2DISCi;j;t þ dk3REVPi;j;tDISCi;j;t þ Rm/kmControlsi;j;t




Intercept 0.502 (34.30)*** 0.265 (42.16)***
REVP + 31.575 (22.01)*** 12.935 (21.00)***
DISC )0.0585 ()1.41) 0.028 (1.55)
REVP*DISC ) )0.851 ()1.02) )0.536 ()1.49)
Coefﬁcient estimates of forecast and ﬁrm control
variables are suppressed
Adj. R2 2.70%*** 2.46%***
F (1): Intercept 449.83***
F (1): REVP 289.07***
F (1): DISC 7.36***
F (1): REVP*DISC 0.24
F (1): REVP + REVP*DISC 306.06***
Notes:
This table reports results from estimating (3) to evaluate the abnormal trading volume
response to earnings forecast revisions by disclosed (DISC) versus non-disclosed analysts
during the sample period 1990–2005. The sample consists of ﬁrm-quarters with at least
one disclosed analyst and at least one non-disclosed analyst forecast. The Forecast
Control variables and DISC are deﬁned in Tables 4 and 5, respectively. The Firm
Control variables are as follows: BM is the beginning of the quarter book-to-market
ratio deﬁned as COMPUSTAT Data59 ⁄ (Data14 x Data61); SIZE is the beginning of the
quarter ﬁrm size deﬁned as ln (Data14 x Data61); BETA is obtained from a ﬁrm-speciﬁc
regression of the ﬁrm’s daily return on the value-weighted market index daily return
using the 100 trading days ending 10 days before the forecast revision date; FOLLOW is
the number of independent analysts following ﬁrm j in quarter t. Across models, we
calculate t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for both heteroskedasticity and
intra-analyst error correlation (Rogers 1994). AVOLUME is abnormal volume,
calculated as the dollar trading volume for ﬁrm j in investor group k during the three-
day window centered on analyst i’s earnings forecast revision minus the average dollar
trading volume for ﬁrm j in investor group k during three-day, nonoverlapping windows
during the year, scaled by the average dollar trading volume for ﬁrm j in investor group
k during three-day, nonoverlapping windows during the year. REVP is analyst i’s price-
deﬂated earnings forecast revision for ﬁrm j in quarter t. AVOLUME and REVP are
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles; the minimum price deﬂator for REVP is $1.
* Two-tailed p < 0.10; ** two-tailed p < 0.05; *** two-tailed p < 0.01.
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Regarding the market response, if the weaker market reaction appears only
in the postincident period, this suggests that the market is semi-strong efﬁ-
cient by pricing the public disclosure of the disclosed incident. However, if
the market discount exists both in the pre and post periods, this suggests
strong-form efﬁciency where the market discounted its responses to disclosed
analysts’ earnings forecast revisions even before the disclosure incident.
To evaluate which explanation is more descriptively valid, we examine
the preincident period sample. Untabulated results from estimating (1) on
the preincident sample reveal a negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient estimate
on DISC, (a1 = )0.020, t = )1.70, p < 0.10). Untabulated results from
estimating (2) to evaluate the short-window market reaction based on the
pre-event period reveals an insigniﬁcant parameter estimate REVP*DISC,
(b3 = 0.156, t = 0.48, p > 0.10). We interpret the accuracy result as indi-
cating that the disclosure variable picks up a persistent analyst characteris-
tic. The lack of a weaker market reaction in the pre-event period suggests
that the disclosure signal is informative to capital markets.25
Analysts with multiple disclosure events
To address the possibility that analysts with multiple disclosure events exhi-
bit either differential forecasting performance or market responses to their
research, we create an indicator variable MDISC, equal to 1 for analysts
with multiple disclosure events and 0 otherwise. Untabulated results from
estimating (1) to evaluate forecast accuracy with the addition of MDISC
reveals a negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on our variable of interest,
DISC (a1 = )0.025, t = )2.39, p < 0.05), with no incremental effect
related to analysts with multiple disclosure events, MDISC (a2 = 0.012,
t = 0.84, p > 0.10). Untabulated results from estimating (2) to evaluate
the short-window market reaction with the addition MDISC reveals a
negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on our variable of interest, REVP*DISC
(b3 = )0.192, t = )2.90, p < 0.01), with no incremental effect related
to analysts with multiple disclosure events, REVP*MDISC (b5 = 0.091,
t = 0.25, p > 0.10). In sum, there does not appear to be any differential
effect for analysts having one versus multiple disclosure events in the accu-
racy and short-window market reaction analyses.
Age of disclosure incident
The NASD database identiﬁes analysts with background disclosure events
for analysts currently employed by a member brokerage ﬁrm and those
employed by a member brokerage ﬁrm within the last two years; there is no
25. Untabulated results for accuracy and market response models based on an integrated
model of both pre- and postincident samples and relying on a period indicator variable
to compare relevant parameter estimates yield similar inferences. In addition, results
from the integrated accuracy model do not reveal signiﬁcant accuracy differences for the
disclosed analysts between the preincident and postincident periods.
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statute of limitations such that if an event occurs beyond a particular time
frame it is removed. We now investigate if there is any variation in the asso-
ciation of the disclosed variable with relative accuracy or market credibility
conditional on the length of time that has elapsed since the incident.
We examine the inﬂuence of elapsed time in years (all inferences are
unchanged if we use time in days as an alternative) by splitting at the med-
ian elapsed time since the disclosed incident using an indicator variable,
LDISC, equal to 1 if the age is greater than or equal to the median and
0 otherwise.26 Untabulated results from estimating (1) to evaluate the
earnings forecast accuracy with the addition of the LDISC variable reveal
a negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on our variable of interest, DISC
(a1 = )0.028, t = )2.19, p < 0.05), but no mitigation of the accuracy
effect for analysts with older incidents, LDISC (a2 = 0.009, t = 0.57, p >
0.10). Untabulated results from estimating (2) to evaluate the short-window
market reaction reveal a negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on our variable
of interest, REVP*DISC (b3 = )0.457, t = )2.26, p < 0.05), but not a
mitigation of the incremental market reaction effect for analysts with older
disclosure incidents, REVP*LDISC (b5 = 0.288, t = 1.36, p > 0.10).
27 In
sum, the accuracy and market response effects do not decay with time, add-
ing support to the notion that the disclosure variable captures an inherent
analyst trait.
Categorizing disclosure incidents: Professional versus personal
Because the various types of disclosures may have different implications for
forecasting performance and market credibility, we categorize disclosure
event types into those of a professional nature and those of a personal
nature.28 We classify customer complaints, regulatory actions, terminations,
and investigations as professional in nature, PROF, and bankruptcies and
judgments ⁄ liens as personal in nature, PERS. Because criminal actions and
civil judicial actions represent a mix of professional and personal incidents,
we omit them from direct classiﬁcation. Some analysts have more than one
disclosure event; for these multiple-event cases, we categorize analysts as
PROF (PERS) only if all their disclosure events are of a professional
26. For analysts with multiple disclosure incidents, we measure the time elapsed since their
ﬁrst disclosure incident, although we also verify that our inferences are unchanged if we
rely on time elapsed since their last disclosure event.
27. In alternative analyses, we examine additional cutoffs, greater (less) than 75th (25th)
elapsed time percentiles as alternative long (short) categorical variables, and greater
(less) than 90th (10th) elapsed time percentiles as extreme long (short) categorical vari-
ables. We also examine the cross-sectional variation as to accuracy and market reaction
with continuous and time-ranked variables. All of these alternatives yield inferences
similar to those based on the median split.
28. An alternative approach is to evaluate the eight types of disclosures individually;
however, given the relatively small samples of each type, we believe that the aggregate
categories lend themselves to more general and stable inferences.
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(personal) nature. If a professional (personal) disclosure event is accompa-
nied by a ‘‘mixed’’ disclosure event, for example, a criminal action or a civil
judicial action, we allow coexistence of a professional or personal disclosure
with a mixed event in the primary analysis and then impose a stricter selec-
tion criterion disallowing such coexistence in a sensitivity check.
Untabulated results from estimating (1) to evaluate earnings forecast
accuracy based on the PROF and PERS indicators reveal a negative and
signiﬁcant coefﬁcient estimate on PROF (=)0.025, t = )2.71, p < 0.01)
and an insigniﬁcant estimate on PERS. A second estimation using the stric-
ter deﬁnition of PROF and PERS also reveals a negative and signiﬁcant
coefﬁcient on PROF (=)0.030, t = )2.94, p < 0.01) and an insigniﬁcant
estimate on PERS. Untabulated results from estimating (2) to evaluate the
short-window market reaction based on the PROF and PERS indicators
reveals negative parameter estimates on the interaction terms (as expected);
however, the estimates are not signiﬁcant at conventional levels in either
estimation.29 In sum, our results suggest that earnings forecast accuracy is
driven more by professional than by personal disclosure events; however,




In the preceding earnings accuracy and market models, it is possible that
brokerage house status or resource availability is not well proxied by a
linear brokerage size measure. To investigate, we replace BSIZE with
B_STATUS_SIZE = 1 for the 10 largest brokerage houses each year and 0
otherwise; B_STATUS_IIAA = 1 for the 10 ﬁrms with the most Institu-
tional Investor All-American analysts each year and 0 otherwise; and
B_STATUS_CM = 1 for the 10 highest ranked ﬁrms each year based on a
modiﬁed Carter-Manaster measure of brokerage house status relying on
underwriters’ relative placements in stock offering ‘‘tombstone’’ announce-
ments (Carter and Manaster 1990; Carter, Dark, and Singh 1998; Loughran
and Ritter 2004). Untabulated results from estimating (1) to evaluate
earnings forecast accuracy based on these alternative brokerage house
status proxies continue to reveal a negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on
our variable of interest, DISC (a1: SIZE = )0.022, t = )2.58, p < 0.01;
a1: CM = )0.022, t = )2.62, p < 0.01; a1: IIAA = )0.022, t = )2.55,
p < 0.01). Untabulated results from estimating (2) to evaluate the
29. We believe the lack of differential market pricing is due to the market response effect
hinging on the aggregate DISC measure. That is, the additional requirement of the
returns data, the omission of two categories (the criminal actions and the civil judicial
actions that mix professional and personal activities), and the separation of the remain-
ing observations into categories of incidents do not allow for sufﬁcient power to
discriminate between these categories of incidents.
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short-window market reaction based on the alternative proxies also reveal a
negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on our variable of interest, REVP*DISC
(b3: SIZE = )0.175, t = )2.84, p < 0.01; b3: CM = )0.172, t = )2.94,
p < 0.01; b3: IIAA = )0.173, t = )2.91, p < 0.01). In sum, the alternative
brokerage status proxies yield results that are inferentially similar to our
main results.
Thinly followed ﬁrms
Our primary analyses require at least two analysts following a ﬁrm-quarter,
one disclosed analyst and one nondisclosed analyst. To address the concern
over inferences based on thinly followed ﬁrms, we conduct sensitivity anal-
yses imposing a constraint of at least ﬁve analysts following the ﬁrm in
both the forecast accuracy and market reaction tests. Untabulated results
from evaluating forecast accuracy based on a constraint of at least ﬁve
analysts continues to reveal a negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient estimate
on our variable of interest, DISC (a1 = )0.016, t = )1.76, p < 0.10), and
evaluating the short-window market reaction based on the same constraint
reveals a negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient estimate on our variable of
interest, REVP*DISC (b3 = )0.191, t = )2.82, p < 0.01). Thus, our
results are not signiﬁcantly affected by the presence of thinly followed
companies.
Broker expungement
An analyst or broker can appeal a disclosed incident; however, the NASD
(currently the FINRA) expunges an incident only if an arbitration panel
orders an expungement and a court conﬁrms the ﬁnding. According to the
NASD, instances that are most likely to lead to an expungement include
the following: (1) the claim, allegation, or information that the disclosed
incident is factually impossible or wrong; (2) the named person is incorrect;
or (3) the claim, allegation, or information is false. While expungements are
rarely granted, the majority of those successfully pursued are based on
customer complaints, which are the most subjective of the eight types of
disclosure events. As a sensitivity test, we reanalyze our results after omit-
ting customer complaint disclosure incidents. Untabulated results from eval-
uating earnings forecast accuracy after eliminating customer complaints
continues to reveal a negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on our variable
of interest, DISC (a1 = )0.020, t = )2.13, p < 0.05), and evaluating
short-window market reactions after eliminating customer complaints also
continues to reveal a negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on REVP*DISC
(b3 = )0.194, t = )2.85, p < 0.01).
Media coverage and disclosed analysts
Bonner et al. (2007) show a larger market reaction to celebrity analysts,
where celebrity is measured by the quantity of media coverage. If the
disclosed analysts are not covered in the media due to the ﬁnancial press
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wishing to avoid less reputable analysts, then it may be the reduced
media coverage affecting the market reaction rather than the disclosed
incident itself. Because undertaking a hand-collection of media coverage of
individual analysts is beyond the scope of this study, as an alternative, we
model the variables found to be related to media coverage in Bonner et al.
2007 as control variables in our market model as a sensitivity analysis.
These media coverage determinants include number of ﬁrms followed, fore-
cast frequency, general experience, forecast bias, award status, and forecast
accuracy. Of these variables, the ones not already included as control vari-
ables are forecast bias and award status. Adding these additional variables
and related interactions, untabulated results from estimating (2) continue to
reveal a negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on our variable of interest,
REVP*DISC (b3 = )0.189, t = )2.58, p < 0.01). Thus, it does not appear
that including media coverage determinants alters the ﬁnding of a reduced
market reaction to disclosed analysts’ forecast revisions.
7. Conclusions
Skepticism concerning brokerage industry self-regulation is not surprising
due to conﬂicts of interest faced by the NASD, the industry’s largest regula-
tory body, in its role as both industry regulator and promoter of its constit-
uents’ interests. Barber et al. (2006) ﬁnd beneﬁcial outcomes to investors of
an industry initiative requiring brokerage ﬁrm-level stock recommendation
distribution disclosures in their analyst reports. We extend this line of
research on brokerage self-regulation by examining an industry initiative
designed to inform investors regarding investment professionals’ back-
grounds. Our aim is to evaluate if investors who are uninformed as to an
analyst’s background can beneﬁt from accessing such disclosures.
Consistent with the notion that disclosed analysts’ forecasts are less
reliable, we ﬁnd that disclosed analysts forecast earnings less accurately vis-
a`-vis a ﬁrm-quarter matched sample of nondisclosed analysts and that this
effect is present both prior to and after their disclosure incidents. Based on
this result, and supplemental analyses examining the impact of multiple dis-
closure events and the effect of the age of the disclosure event, we conclude
that their inferior accuracy is consistent with the disclosure signal capturing
a persistent analyst characteristic (rather than as a result of the disclosure
signal per se). We ﬁnd a relatively weaker market reaction to revisions by
disclosed analysts only in the postincident period, consistent with the dis-
closure signal providing new information to equity investors.
In addition to these ﬁndings, we acknowledge two results deserving
additional discussion. The ﬁrst such result is that we did not ﬁnd the
market to discount forecast revisions from disclosed analysts in the pre-
disclosure period. This is surprising because we ﬁnd that disclosed analysts
were less accurate than other analysts during this time period, and past
research has shown that the market prices past accuracy (e.g., Park and
Stice 2000; Bonner et al. 2003; Clement and Tse 2003; Chen et al. 2005).
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We believe there are at least two explanations for why we failed to
detect such an effect. First, prior work ﬁnds that the market reaction to
forecast revisions is consistent with investors reﬁning their knowledge of
analyst ability over time (Chen et al. 2005). By construction, the disclosed
analysts in the predisclosure period have fewer forecast observations avail-
able to the market than do the same analysts later in time (i.e., after the dis-
closure event). Thus, a less complete forecasting record may prevent the
market from forming sufﬁciently precise performance assessments. Indeed,
scenarios such as this may underpin the NASD’s motivation to undertake
the disclosure initiative in the ﬁrst place. That is, if the NASD viewed avail-
able forecasting patterns as sufﬁcient to evaluate analysts, there would be
little need for such a program. Second, our research design entails a number
of sample restrictions; among the most restrictive is inclusion of only ana-
lysts forecasting in both the pre and post periods. While we view this design
feature as necessary to prevent comparison between two different samples
of disclosed analysts, it reduces the sample available for our market tests
well below samples in comparable studies.
With respect to another ﬁnding that deserves explanation, we did not ﬁnd
that large investors differentially discount forecasts from disclosed analysts.
We believe there are at least two explanations for why we failed to detect such
an effect. First, this analysis separates the large from the small trades, reduc-
ing the power of our test. Second, in contrast to our reasoning in the third
hypothesis, large traders — the ones most likely to know of the NASD data-
base — may not beneﬁt much from disclosure initiatives because they are
more likely to be ex ante informed concerning an analyst’s background.
We draw the following conclusions from the totality of our results.
First, ex ante uninformed investors seeking relatively more accurate or cred-
ible earnings research (as perceived by the market in general) can beneﬁt
from public disclosures of analyst backgrounds. Second, the market acts as
if it prices this disclosure signaling a persistent analyst credibility character-
istic associated with analysts’ backgrounds.
We make several contributions to the literature. First, in an environ-
ment of skepticism regarding the self-regulation model of the ﬁnancial
industry, we add to the literature on regulatory initiatives by showing the
relevance to market participants of a particular disclosure initiative involv-
ing investment professionals’ backgrounds. Second, our ﬁnding that dis-
closed analysts forecast less accurately than other analysts is relevant to
research on forecasting accuracy per se because the market relies on fore-
casts to form its earnings expectations and as inputs to other important
research outputs. Third, investors rate integrity and professionalism as one
of the most important attributes of an equity research ﬁrm (Institutional
Investor 2006). To the extent that the NASD disclosures provide reasonable
— albeit noisy — proxies for analyst integrity and professionalism, we show
that such analysts are less accurate earnings forecasters and their forecast
revisions are less credible.
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Appendix
Examples of speciﬁc disclosure events
Criminal action
Reporting source: Individual broker (Form U-4). Court details: State Attor-
ney Sixteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida. Charge detail: resisting arrest with
violence charge — felony.
Customer complaint
Reporting source: Individual broker (Form U-4). Allegations: That an
investment in Circle K stock in a retirement account resulted in a loss and
that the investment was unsuitable. Alleged damages: $29,758.00. Case was
settled for $10,000.
Bankruptcy
Reporting source: Individual broker (Form U-4). Mr. X ﬁled chapter 7
bankruptcy due to real estate investment activities in 1980s. Attempted to
reorganize via chapter 11, three times. Finally completed chapter 7, full
liquidation, in February of 1998.
Regulatory action
Reporting source: Regulator (Form U-6). Violation of the rules of fair prac-
tice in that employee performed consulting services for a client company for
which he sent, or caused to be sent, a personal bill, the proceeds of which
he received and deposited to his personal bank account; and performed con-
sulting services without informing his employer, and sent, or caused to be
sent, a personal bill when the customer believed they had employed him as
an employee of the brokerage. Decision rendered: employee censured and
ﬁned $5,000.
Termination
Reporting source: Individual broker (Form U-4). Allegations: Firm alleged
that employee signed Firm into a lease and represented himself as an ofﬁcer
of the ﬁrm without authorization and approval from the ﬁrm and entered
into a personal lease as the corporation.
Civil judicial action
Reporting source: Individual broker (Form U-4). Plaintiff brings this action
pursuant to federal rule of civil procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of all
persons who purchased shares of Interspeed common stock during the per-
iod of 1 ⁄3 ⁄2000 through 7 ⁄20 ⁄00. Summary: Mr. X along with his previous
employer is the subject of a securities class action involving the interaction
between the investment banking and sales department regarding Interspeed
and issuance of research.
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Investigation
Reporting source: Individual broker (Form U-4). The division of enforce-
ment of the NYSE is investigating Mr. X in connection with certain
research reports he had a role in drafting.
Judgments ⁄ liens
Reporting Source: Individual broker (Form U-4). Holder of lien is IRS.
Amount of lien is $9,500.28.
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